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TO WIN THE HEARTS AND MINDS: EVANGELICAL MISSION
ACTIVITY IN ALBANIA AS GLOBAL CULTURE WAR

By Linford Stutzman

Linford Stutzman (Mennonite) has taught in the Bible and Religion Dept. of the Eastern Mennonite
University and in the Eastern Mennonite Seminary in Harrisonburg, VA, since 1992. In 1990 he taught at the
Baptist Theological College in Perth, Australia, and led seminars and workshops on faith and modern culture in
Germany and Australia from 1980 to 1990. Ordained in 1978, he was pastor of a Mennonite church in 1977-78,
then a mission worker with the Eastern Mennonite Board in Munich (1978-86) in Perth (1986-90). He attended
Lane Community College, Eugene, OR; received a B.A. from Eastern Mennonite College and an M.A.R. (1990)
from Eastern Mennonite Seminary; and has been a Ph.D. candidate at the Catholic University of America since
1991. His dissertation is on "Gramsci's Theory of Cultural Hegemony Applied to Contemporary Evangelical
Missions: The Case of Albania." He has written for the Missionary Messenger and published With Jesus in the
World (Herald Press, 1992).

I. Introduction
As the ideological influence of Marxism is disintegrating in most regions of Eastern Europe, evangelical
missions from the West, particularly from North America, have proliferated. New strategic political and religious
alliances are being formed in the ideological vacuum created in these societies that are undergoing rapid and
extensive reorganization. Emerging interest groups are engaging in struggles for positions of influence. There is a
global "culture war"1 going on in Eastern Europe, and Evangelicals from the West are among the contenders in it.
Albania has experienced one of the most dramatic collapses of both Marxist ideology and the related
institutional infrastructures. In the resulting ideological vacuum, representatives of new ideas of all kinds, both good
and bad, are being drawn from every conceivable ideological and geographical direction. In addition, Albania is
experiencing a resurgence of activity and influence by the historical religious groups--Roman Catholic, Orthodox,
and Muslim. This dramatic influx of evangelical mission agencies and personnel from the West into a context of
religious resurgence and competition makes Albania an ideal environment in which to conduct research into the
nature of current evangelical missionary enterprise in Eastern Europe.
Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony provides a theoretical approach for the analysis of the
ideological and competitive dimensions of contemporary evangelical mission within Eastern Europe, specifically in
Albania. ". . . Gramsci can inspire fresh thought in historians from a variety of intellectual traditions. . . . Gramsci's
work . . . provides a theoretical framework and a vocabulary for understanding historiographical problems that have
asserted themselves with special force during the last fifteen years."2
Gramsci's theory is a dynamic approach to religion. It illuminates the manner in which social groups use
the power of ideas to initiate societal change according to their specific vision of the future. This theory will be used
to test widespread assumptions about the nature of North American evangelical missions, especially in Eastern
Europe, as being, under the cloak of Christian mission, the promotion of such American ideals as democracy,
voluntarism, individual rights, and free enterprise.3 My own hypothesis is that these widespread assumptions are
essentially accurate.
In order to test the assumptions and my own hypothesis about evangelical missions, using Gramsci's theory
of cultural hegemony, during the summer of 1994 I conducted two periods of research among member organizations
of the "Albanian Encouragement Project" (AEP), an umbrella organization for Evangelicals in Albania operating an
administrative and coordination office in the capital city, Tiranë. Membership in AEP requires the acceptance of the
"Lausanne Covenant," the definitive statement of evangelical missions that emerged from the International Congress

on World Evangelism held in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1974. There are currently about sixty-five member
organizations with over 300 long-term missionaries working in Albania, almost all from North America and
Western Europe. In addition, approximately 100 other evangelical missionaries from the West, who are not
members of AEP, are presently active in Albania.
In Albania I conducted extensive interviews with thirty-five key AEP missionaries and with representatives
and leaders of the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim communities. I also presented and used a questionnaire to test the
conclusions of this research with thirty-eight representatives of the AEP member organizations at their annual
meeting in Switzerland in October, 1994.
I will begin with a brief summary of Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony as it applies to the study of
evangelical mission, then make some observations about how Evangelicals are currently struggling for hegemony in
Albania. Finally, I will draw some conclusions based on the application of Gramsci's theory to the evidence from the
field research.
II. Gramsci's Theory of Cultural Hegemony
Antonio Gramsci, who developed the concept of cultural hegemony, was an ethnic Albanian, born and
raised in Italy. This brilliant leader of the Communist Party, for a time a member of the Italian parliament, was
thirty-five years old when arrested by Mussolini's political police. Sentenced to twenty years in prison in Turi, Italy,
he survived only ten. During these ten years of declining health, refusing any special treatment, Gramsci wrote his
most important observations about cultural hegemony.
The theory of cultural hegemony is at the heart of Gramsci's arguments. Although his translated writings
contain no precise definition of cultural hegemony, one characterization of hegemony that is seen as central is the ".
. . `spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life
by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is `historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence)
which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production."4
Gramsci noted that, if a particular vision of the future is held by a group of people committed to and
confidently communicating that vision, such a group wields a powerful influence within society. These ideas are
inevitably in competition, or outright conflict, with ideas held by other groups committed to a different vision.
Hegemony, then, is about the triumph of certain socially held ideas over others, ideas that catch the imagination and
catalyze increasing numbers of people in a society who eventually change the course of history. What is especially
insightful in Gramsci's theory is that these ideas are not the results of blind forces of history or economic
determinism but are deliberately generated and propagated by people who have "faith" in the vision by which they
live, whether they be Marxists or Christians, and who intentionally seek to win the hearts and minds of people to this
vision.
Gramsci recognized that adherents of religion make up such a group of people committed to a vision. He
admired the cultural power of organized religion, even while disagreeing with its presuppositions.5 He viewed
religion as being one contender among many competing cultural forces for the hearts and minds of people. Gramsci
believed that religion could be a reactionary force, preserving the status quo, or, in a fundamental break with
classical Marxist theory, it could be a revolutionary force of liberation and social change on a popular level.
For Gramsci, transcendence is an historical, material as well as an intellectual-moral achievement. This . . .
allows Gramsci to identify in the religion of the people a revolutionary capacity, as exemplified by the antiestablishment `heretical' movements in the Middle Ages, by the Reformation and even by the Protestant ethic
and its entrepreneurial spirit.6
A key feature of cultural hegemony is the role of the "organic intellectual." Organic intellectuals are leaders
who envision the future and articulate this vision in a way that connects it to the pre-existing aspirations and
longings of the common people. This is an educational function. Empowerment of the common people by
enlightening them to their own historical significance is central, for "it is this attainment of historical awareness, the
realization of what is the right course for himself and for the society in which he lives that makes the role of the
intellectual all-important in Gramsci's theory of revolutionary change."7

Although Gramsci believed that "all men are philosophers," the "common sense" of the masses is
insufficient for the critique of society, for it is "not critical and coherent but disjointed and episodic." Political
education is necessary if the popular common sense can be transformed into critical understanding. "Thus Gramsci
believed that, with leadership provided by organic intellectuals from within their own class and by other intellectual
allies, workers and peasants would be able to construct oppositional conceptions of life that would become popular
and hegemonic."8
Organic intellectuals not only articulate the vision but also embody it, and they organize groups of people
who live according to it. Organic intellectuals are
able to organise social groups and direct them throughout all their activities. . . . [This occurs] through the
concept of `hegemonic apparatuses' (schools, churches and media) which are the instruments for the exercise of
hegemony and through which organic intellectuals become organisers. These organisers (organic intellectuals)
are the agents of this practice. They are the ones, according to Gramsci, in charge of elaborating and spreading
organic ideologies and who will have to realise the moral and intellectual reform.9
Gramsci assumed that in the democratic West, where there is a "free market" of ideas, this commitment by
the people on a popular level must be voluntary in order to succeed in winning hegemony and permanently changing
society. It is necessary then, for committed groups of organic intellectuals, the vanguards of the new order, to win
the hearts and the minds of people by persuasion rather than by coercion. When this occurs, and as increasing
numbers of people in a given society voluntarily accept the vision of the organic intellectuals and become committed
to the ideals articulated by them, a "historic bloc" is created that becomes capable of winning the ideological war
against the competition within society. "Thus, in contrast to the state, understood as the apparatus of government,
stands civil society. In contrast to the moment of force and dictatorship there is the moment of persuasion and
consent."10
This process of voluntary ideological change is, according to Gramsci, the only change that will triumph
and endure within society in the West, for these ideas do not remain ". . . individual fancies, but are embodied in
collective and communal modes of living."11 Thus, ideas embraced by individuals who collectively create new
historical blocs impact all of society as they are integrated into public policy, national culture, and institutional
structures.
A key element for the successful emergence of new historic blocs, according to Gramsci, must be the
engagement in "conscious planned struggle." This is not simply an issue of "capturing" the state. The power of a
new historic bloc within civil society is its persuasive ideas and arguments. The initial persuasive power of these
ideas and arguments, as Dwight Billings has pointed out,12 is contingent upon the social support (or "plausibility
structures," in Peter Berger's terms) that they have at the outset and are able to win. Gramsci argued that, initially,
the acceptance of new ideas within society depends less on the "rational form in which the new conceptions is
expounded" or on the "authority . . . of the expositor" than on "faith . . . in the social group to which [they] belong."
Although the common people may not be able fully to understand the arguments of the new ideas, they accept them
and remain convinced that the arguments are sound, for "so many like-thinking people can't be wrong."13
Although Gramsci limited his theory of cultural hegemony to Western Europe, recently others, such as
Stephen Gill and David Law, have sought to apply Gramsci's ideas internationally, demonstrating "that it is possible
to conceive of hegemony and the formation of historic blocs on a world scale."14 They write, "Cementing this order
[U.S.-centered international capitalism following World War II] was what we term a new international historic bloc
of social forces, centered in the United States. This bloc originated in the outward expansion of the social forces
associated with . . . an American `multinational bloc.'"15
The observations of Gill and Law are especially helpful, for, in addition to the accumulation of capital as a
hegemonic force, they point out other factors that contribute to Western global hegemony, such as the ideological
climate on a global level converging with the accumulation of hegemonic "assets" possessed by the West, such as
information, technology, English language, education, and media. These together not only allow the coordination of
North American hegemonic activity around the world but also represent the power of the ideology that drives it.
It would seem that the hegemonic assets accumulated by and centered in the West make possible the
coordination of a particular kind of hegemonic activity around the world--evangelical mission. We will now

examine the agendas and activities of evangelical missionaries in Albania in light of these central concepts within
Gramsci's theories of cultural hegemony.
III. Christian Religion and Cultural Hegemony
The hegemonic nature of organized religion was clearly understood by Gramsci. John Fulton points out that
Gramsci saw
religions as political realities. This reality is not always of a conservative kind, and socialists can even in
modern times find allies with religious movements and persons. . . . In any event, religion is always political for
Gramsci. It is part of the interior character of religion as a total praxis, a form of power and activity in society. It
is this praxis character which marks it off from philosophy and renders it both similar and dangerous to socialist
praxis. In summary, Gramsci finds elements of belief, commitment, culture, and power in all active conceptions
of the world, principally in religions, but in a superior way in socialism.16
Gramsci's analysis of religion is based both on his observations of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy,
struggling to preserve its position of hegemony and the status quo that supported it, and on his limited awareness of
popular, religious/revolutionary movements in history. Had Gramsci lived to see contemporary evangelical mission
activity in Eastern Europe, he would have had further evidence with which to strengthen his arguments about the
hegemonic, competitive, and potentially revolutionary nature of religion, especially of evangelical mission.
Sociological and historical studies support the portrayal in the Gospels of the revolutionary character of
Jesus' announcing the Good News of the Reign of God. It was a message that, when accepted, caused social
divisions. ("I am come to bring a sword.") It was attractive to some and threatening to others. The message of the
gospel seemed to be attractive when it corresponded to and fulfilled the pre-existing aspirations, hopes, and longings
of the common people. It was threatening when it countered pre-existing aspirations, hopes and longings of other
social groups and institutions, especially those of the powerful religious elite who dominated religious thought and
life and who were seeking to protect or establish their privileged hegemonic position within the social order.
The Gospel parables comparing the Reign of God and its expansive power within the world to that of the
mustard seed, of leaven, and of the net attest to the observation that mission is a potentially revolutionary hegemonic
force within culture. This is observable in history, for, within cultures where the gospel has taken root, churches
have formed. The hegemony of this new historical bloc as it grows increasingly challenges the hegemony of existing
social groups and institutions, including religious ones.
The parallels between Gramsci's version of the Marxist mission and evangelical versions of Christian
mission are striking. Both presuppose the ultimate triumph of their vision. In spite of their confidence about ultimate
triumph, both recognize the necessity of deliberate, participatory, and competitive activism in order to win the hearts
and minds of the people to the vision to which they are committed. Both recognize the significance of their
struggle.17 Both advocate change and transformation. The central ideas of the Reign of God in the Gospels, like the
central tenets of Marxism, offer a view of the world and a vision for the future that are both powerfully attractive
among those segments of society that are longing for fundamental social change and powerfully threatening to other
social groups and institutions that have a vested interest in preventing this kind of change from occurring. Both
experience powerful, organized resistance. Finally, there are versions of both the Marxist and the Christian visions
that transcend nationalistic interests.
Power has become a sensitive issue for promoters of mission since the era of colonial missions, for there is
an awareness that the alliances made between those with religious and nationalistic ambitions often created the
antithesis of the Reign of God, as such alliances still do. The theory of cultural hegemony, however, gives the
opportunity to examine the competitive and ideological nature of evangelical missions in terms of its practice rather
than its theology and to evaluate its relationships among other competitors. This we will now do.
IV. The Hegemonic Presence of Western Evangelicals in Albania
Evangelical missionaries from the West are a hegemonic force in Albania both by virtue of the cultural
assets they possess and by virtue of their deliberate strategy of mission. They are powerful both intentionally and
unintentionally. In this section I will identify several sources and examples of this unintentional cultural hegemony

that Western evangelical missionaries in Albania enjoy. These include the missionaries' representation of Western
culture, the missionaries' embodiment of a westernized gospel, and the pragmatic organization of structures that
evangelical missionaries create for their enterprise.
A. The Representation of Western Culture
The cultural hegemony of Westerners in Albania today is a corollary to what evangelical missionaries there
describe as "openness." Although these missionaries give a variety of explanations for the current Albanian
openness they experience, within the theoretical framework of cultural hegemony it can best be described as the
ideological vacuum created by the disintegration of the monopoly of Marxism. Following the collapse of the old
system, several things occurred. Albanians who had secretly hungered and thirsted for "righteousness" as they
imagined it suddenly could do so openly. In the moral ambiguity and ideological chaos following Marxism's
collapse, any new idea was perceived to be better than confusion, better than Albanian ideas, and better than old
ideas. Foreigners--especially from the West and representing immediate solutions--imported ideas, and new ideas
were immensely attractive.
Most evangelical missionaries with whom I spoke recognize the problems in this kind of indiscriminate
openness. Evangelical missionaries must compete with other Westerners for the hearts and minds of Albanians,
often, from their point of view, unfairly. Being without critical or historical tools, Albanians often were, and still are,
open to those ideas that promise the most in the least amount of time. Under such conditions, Evangelicals tend to
see Mormons as having an initial advantage over Methodists, soft drink bottling plants over Christian bookstores.
Openness for missionaries means an open market that includes attractive "false" ideas.
In spite of this competition of Western ideas within Albania, all foreigners from the West, especially from
North America, presently have a competitive advantage over non-Western foreigners, for they represent a culture
that epitomizes popular Albanian concepts of goodness, progress, and prosperity. These popular concepts, fueled by
years of general deprivation, are assumptions about the West, especially about North America, that derive from
media images, relatives in New York, and fertile imaginations. Evangelical missionaries from North America belong
to the "international historic bloc of social forces, centered in the United States" mentioned above.
The general attractiveness of Western--especially North American--culture on a popular level makes
evangelical missionary presence hegemonic, for these missionaries unavoidably represent and embody the
powerfully attractive culture from which they come. However, this causes a dilemma, for Evangelicals perceive
many features of North American culture, such as hedonism, individualism, and materialism, to be antithetical to the
gospel they attempt to communicate. Thus, North American evangelical missionaries are at once reluctant and
powerful representatives of North American culture. My research showed remarkable consensus among
missionaries; they see their cultural hegemony that originates in the magnetic appeal of North American culture as
being both an asset and a liability in their efforts at communicating the gospel effectively.
While North American Evangelicals are inevitable representatives of North American culture, they are not
deliberate, conscious promoters of it. The overwhelming evidence from my field research is that North American
evangelical missionaries are generally more critical of American culture, including the American evangelical
church, and more optimistic about Albanian culture than any other North Americans in Albania whom I
interviewed.18
B. The Embodiment of a Westernized Gospel
Evangelical missionaries from North America embody a gospel that has both been shaped by and shaped
American culture. They perceive that some of the features of North American society in which they believe strongly
are values within the gospel message that have been integrated into the public values and institutional structures of
North American society. Evangelical missionaries consider these values and ideals, such as democracy, justice,
freedom and equality, to be good, not only for them but also for everyone else in all parts of the world.
This powerful overlap of the gospel they embody and the culture they represent creates a unique
competitive advantage for the North American evangelical missionary for winning the hearts and minds of
Albanians. I would like to cite three ways that I observed evangelical missionaries in Albania exercising this
unintentional cultural hegemony.

1. Missionary self-respect and confidence. There is almost unanimous agreement among missionaries that,
within Albania, they feel relevant, effective, and even privileged. This self-respect and confidence by a particular
group of North Americans is powerful, even magnetic, within a chaotic, changing, and humiliated society.
Missionaries feel more confident about their ability to have a positive impact on Albanian culture than on their own.
This confidence arises from being both a missionary19 and an American.
2. Respect of Albanian culture and optimism for Albania's future. The evangelical missionaries I
interviewed were overwhelmingly positive about Albanian culture. As a whole, there is an attitude of realistic
optimism among evangelical missionaries. Groups of Westerners who share respect for a demeaned people are
powerful. Optimism about the future of a society that is suddenly free to hope again increases the power of visionary
groups within it. This contagious and powerful optimism seems to be based on convictions about both the gospel (it
will triumph) and culture (Albanian culture can, like American culture, be positively impacted by gospel values).
3. Embodiment of hope and vision. Evangelical missionaries, as a group, demonstrate a kind of prophetic
attraction within Albania. The prophet, or the organic intellectual in Gramsci's scheme, is one who is in touch with
the longings and aspirations of the common people and who can articulate and demonstrate a corresponding vision
of the future in a way that focuses these aspirations in new directions. Evangelical missionaries, as prophets,
embody change and hope. They stand in solidarity with the common people, communicating their positive views
about, and faith in, the potential of ordinary Albanians, by inviting them to join in their faith communities and to
assume responsibilities within them.
This powerful presence again can be seen as originating from gospel ideals, such as the priesthood of all
believers, and from the North American cultural value of the inherent worth and potential of every human being,
regardless of status.
C. The Pragmatic Organization of Mission Structures
The final feature of unintentional hegemony is the pragmatic organizational network of AEP. The
communication and networking infrastructure, originally developed out of necessity within the context of Albanian
infrastructual collapse, today eclipses anything done by any other organization in the country. What makes AEP
unique is that it is a network of diverse organizations with a common general goal, rather than a monolithic,
centralized bureaucracy. This is both perceived to be, and actually is, a powerful entity within Albania. It allows
local adaptations in every locality and rapid responses to changes occurring within Albanian society. It gives the
possibility of an amazing voluntary solidarity within general social fragmentation. In a society whose infrastructure
is in shambles, where there is a distrust of neighbors and bureaucracies, voluntary organizational networking and
technological interdependence are in themselves hegemonic. This organizational structure represents a convergence
of the basic ideal of Christian unity within the Gospels, as well as the pragmatism of American organizational
genius.
V. Evangelical Missions in Albania as Global Culture War
In addition to the hegemony that North American evangelical missionaries in Albania possess by virtue of
the hegemonic assets identified above, my research shows that missionaries believe in and exercise what they see as
"appropriate cultural hegemony" for themselves that is intentional, competitive, and strategic. This hegemony is
seen to be appropriate when it derives directly from the power of the gospel within culture or indirectly from those
parts of Western culture that have been shaped by the values of Christianity. The missionaries to whom I spoke
believe that they can appropriate and maximize this "appropriate hegemony" in ways that will help to set the
direction for the emerging evangelical Albanian church, ensuring that the gospel shapes the cultural reformation of
Albania, moving the nation in the direction of freedom and democracy. The following four main areas of deliberate
hegemony were identified and affirmed by the majority of AEP representatives:
A. The Promotion of the Concept of Religious Freedom and the Struggle to Prevent the (Re)establishment of
Religion
Religious freedom, defined as the separation of church and state and the nonestablishment of religion, is
seen by North American evangelical missionaries as a gospel-derived principle that has been incorporated into
American public values. Religious freedom is promoted by all evangelical missionaries as a necessary component of

democracy, freedom, and the success for the gospel to affect Albanian culture in a way that would ensure its
reaching its full potential. The promotion of the concept of religious freedom by Western evangelical missionaries is
an important feature of the global culture war for two reasons.
First, it is important in terms of cultural hegemony. The idea of religious freedom is extremely appealing to
many Albanians, for it corresponds to their assumptions about the West, its freedoms, its stable democracy, and its
economic success. The hearts and minds of many Albanians are predisposed to freedom. The intentional use of the
concept of religious freedom places evangelical missionaries from North America in a clear hegemonic advantage
within Albania today. It appears that no other religious representatives can function as organic intellectuals among
the victims of monolithic ideology as well as Evangelicals from North America who represent with such deep
convictions the value of religious freedom.20
Religious freedom is also extremely important strategically for the future of the evangelical mission
enterprise and the ongoing expansion of the Albanian evangelical church. Within the context of religious freedom,
in the absence of a religious monopoly, Evangelicals believe that they have a fair chance to win the hearts and minds
of growing numbers of Albanians to their version of the gospel. There is remarkable confidence among evangelical
missionaries in Albania that, under the conditions of religious freedom, they will gain an increasing share of the
"market." They are convinced that only in the context of unfair competition--that is, if religious "monopolies" are
allowed to be re-established in Albania--will Evangelicals fail to compete successfully. The communication of the
gospel by Evangelicals in Albania involves a principled and strategic opposition to religious monopolies of the
historic religious groups in Albania.
It is in this current ideological struggle to define and promote religious freedom within Albania that the
hegemonic and competitive nature of evangelical mission is most apparent. The opposition of Catholic, Orthodox,
and Muslim religious communities of Albania is predictable, for the leaders of these communities recognize their
own relative disadvantage within the struggle for the hearts and minds of Albanians if they are forced to compete in
a religiously "free market." While some leaders of the historic religions of Albania understand and appreciate the
basic incompatibility of modernity with religious establishment in principle, their own strategy for reestablishing
their position of cultural hegemony is to win the people over to support governmental control of religion in some
form or another. This battle is currently raging, and it remains to be seen who will win this crucial one in the culture
war, for all sides, recognizing its long-term importance, are prepared to expend enormous resources and efforts with
the hopes of winning.21
B. Organic Unity within the Organizational Diversity as Foundational for a New "Historic Bloc"
Unity within diversity is at once a Western democratic ideal (e pluribus unum) and a feature of the gospel
(Rev. 7:9) that the majority of evangelical missionaries in Albania utilize powerfully. The organizational and
organic unity among the diverse mission organizations of AEP is unique, not only within Albania but also in almost
every other area of the world. Evangelical missionaries recognize that their cultural hegemony within Albanian
society will be greatest when this organic unity in diversity occurs, for, besides helping to solve practical and
immediate problems, it provides a demonstration of the effectiveness of the gospel in achieving what missionaries
claim it will do: It unites all people into a new historic bloc that will potentially grow and reproduce the organic
unity of the mission organizations. This seems to demonstrate that neither denominational nor national imperialism
is the bottom line for evangelical mission in Albania, and it points once again to the global character of the vision of
the gospel in the world.
Evangelical missionary cooperation across denominational and organizational lines involves sophisticated
communications systems both within Albania and overseas, information-gathering and information-sharing, the
coordination of joint service projects, and the planning of events. A united front is also maintained for the purpose of
cultivating positive and influential relationships with the Albanian government. This unified front in dealing with
government is seen to have potential advantages for the missionaries themselves, resulting in such concessions as
official recognition and tax exemptions. More importantly,this unity is seen as enhancing the evangelical
missionaries' ability to influence decision-making by the current government for the good of all Albanian citizens.
As the infrastructure of Albania develops and as such technology as radios, FAX machines, and telephones
become widely available, making cooperation appear less necessary, the strategic advantage of cooperation within
organizational, denominational, and theological diversity that has characterized AEP since its creation has recently

begun to be rationalized in new ways. AEP member organizations are becoming aware that, if they begin to work
independently, their impact within Albania will become fragmented and defuse, opening the opportunity for the
reestablishment of religious monopolies by the historic groups that have at their disposal tremendous organizational
power and external financial resources. AEP member organizations have recently made clear commitments to build
and strengthen the network of communication, information-sharing, and cooperation during the next few years. This
unique strength of Evangelicals will likely remain a powerful and attractive feature of the evangelical missionary
community within a modernizing society that is recovering from repressive ideological control and that views with
suspicion any alternative that threatens to monopolize society through a centrally organized ideology.
C. Empowerment of the Growing Albanian Evangelical Church as an Emerging Historic Bloc
The value of the inherent dignity and potential of the individual on which Western democracy is based is
seen by Evangelicals to be compatible with the understanding that humans are created in the image of God. Western
evangelical missionaries are uniquely equipped, both culturally and theologically, to empower Albanians by
integrating them into their churches; sharing their knowledge, optimism, and vision about Albania with new
members; and equipping ordinary Albanians to serve and lead within the congregations. There are many examples
of many kinds of empowerment being done by evangelical missionaries. They have researched and publicized the
life and work of an Albanian evangelical leader from the last century, Gjerasim Qiriazi; they have worked to revive
the Evangelical Brotherhood.22 Evangelicals are involved in ambitious educational projects, organizing a range of
options for Albanians from elementary schools to graduate programs.
Evangelical missionaries have facilitated the formation of an Albanian Bible Society. Lamin Sanneh
consistently argues that, contrary to those who would assert that modern mission represents new forms of colonial
subjugation, one of the central activities of contemporary missions, the translation of scripture into the vernacular,
represents empowerment, for it contributes to a society's critical self-understanding, critical understanding about the
culture of the missionaries, and possibilities for making informed choices about its own future.23 Gramsci realized
that "every language contains the elements of a conception of the world."24
Ordinary Albanians participating in evangelical congregations, provided with a new language by
evangelical missionaries, become capable of conceptualizing their world in new ways that challenge the status quo.
The emerging local church--comprised of individuals empowered by hope, encouraged and educated to lead, with a
new way of conceptualizing the world--becomes a new historical bloc within Albanian society. This kind of
empowerment is seen by North American Evangelicals as appropriate cultural hegemony that will potentially impact
all of Albanian society positively.
D. Promotion of a Vision of a "Good Society" with the Albanian Government and Public
The vision of a free and just society wherein individuals take responsibility is a vision compatible with both
Western culture and the gospel that evangelical missionaries represent. While the majority of those I interviewed
saw their activities in Albania as contributing to a cultural reformation that would help establish a "good society," in
which freedom, democracy, and justice would be enjoyed, most evangelical missionaries were outspoken against an
uncritical promotion of North American culture as providing an appropriate model for Albanian society. Instead,
there was widespread affirmation of the ability of Albanians, with the growing influence of Albanian evangelical
Christians, to build their own version of a free and just society. Evangelical missionaries believe that they are
playing a key role in laying this foundation, not only by working to establish the evangelical church in Albania but
also by sharing resources, knowledge, historical perspectives, motivation, and international connections with the
Albanian government and public.
Conclusions
The evidence gathered from the research data does not support my original hypothesis nearly as strongly as
I had expected. In fact, the results necessitate a revision. My conclusions can be summarized as follows.
Evangelical missionaries from North America have a vision for Albania that includes religious freedom,
some form of democracy, an effective and equitable economic system, and a moral foundation on which these can
rest. Evangelical missionaries are convinced that evangelical Christian faith, embraced and adapted by the emerging
evangelical church of Albania, is key for the future of a good Albanian society that will benefit everyone. Their

vision, then, not only goes beyond denominational agenda, but it also includes Albanians of all faith traditions and
of no religious beliefs at all.
North American evangelical mission activity in Albania, instead of being an enterprise driven by
nationalistic impulses, is driven by a vision that transcends national boundaries and interests, a vision at odds with
features of every culture, including many aspects of North American society.25 This vision motivates Evangelicals to
wage an international culture war as an extension of the "culture war" being waged with decreasing success within
America against the dominant "post-Christian" culture. This global culture war is essentially the same in Eastern
Europe as in America, with one main difference. Eastern Europe, where the cultural hegemony of Marxism has
collapsed or is greatly weakened, is perceived to have within it areas of opportunity, not only to wage cultural wars
but also to win them, something that no longer seems possible in the West.26
Although there is the sense of ultimate triumph, Evangelicals recognize the necessity of active participation
in the struggle in order to implement their vision of the gospel within human culture now, everywhere in the world,
for they are convinced their version of the Good News is good for everyone in the same way it is good for North
Americans. The culture war, understood in terms of Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, is a struggle on a global
scale against the competition, both religious and secular, for the hearts and minds of everyone.
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